Environmental Law by White, Steven & Williams, Michael S.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey Article 10
January 1986
Environmental Law
Steven White
Michael S. Williams
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven White and Michael S. Williams, Environmental Law, 16 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1986).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/10
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
WHERE HAVE ALL THE BUTTERFLIES 
GONE? NINTH CIRCUIT 
UPHOLDS DECISION TO 
ALLOW INCIDENTAL TAKING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen/ the 
Ninth Circuit held that a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Ser-
vice) permit allowing the incidental taking of certain endangered 
butterflies from San Bruno Mountain did not violate relevant 
provisions of the Endangered Species Act2 and the National En-
vironmental Policy Act.s In upholding a grant of summary judg-
ment, the court rejected the contentions that the Service had 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the permit, and 
that an Environmental Impact Statement4 was necessary to en-
able the Service to adequately assess the environmental impacts 
of the permit and planned development. II 
II. FACTS 
San Bruno Mountain contains about 3,400 acres of undevel-
1. 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985); (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were 
Ferguson, J., and Curtis, D.J., Central District of California, sitting by designation). 
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). 
4. [d. § 4332(2)(C) (requiring an Environmental Impact Statement or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment). See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1-1502.22 (1984) (stating the 
details regarding the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement). 
5. 760 F.2d at 988, 989. 
93 
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oped land located on the northern San Francisco peninsula.6 
Throughout the early 1970's Visitacion Associates purchased vir-
tually all of the land on the mountain.7 In 1975 Visitacion Asso-
ciates proposed to develop 7,655 residential units, and 2,000 
square feet of office and commercial space on the mountain.6 
This proposal encountered strong opposition from a local envi-
ronmental group, the Committee to Save San Bruno Mountain.9 
Following intense controversy over the appropriate level of de-
velopment of the mountain, San Mateo County adopted the San 
Bruno Mountain General Plan Amendment in 1976. The Gen-
eral Plan Amendment permitted construction of 2,235 residen-
tial units, as well as some office and commercial space, and des-
ignated the remainder of the land on the mountain as open 
space.10 
In 1980, litigation between Visitacion Associates and San 
Mateo County over the General Plan Amendment was settled. 
Under the terms of the settlement, Visitacion Associates sold 
and donated to the county and the state of California over 2,000 
acres of the mountain for park land. The county and Visitacion 
Associates also agreed to designate about one-third of the moun-
tain for development and two-thirds for parks. ll 
Shortly after t1:te settlement was reached, the Service dis-
covered that the Mission Blue Butterfly, which was on the en-
dangered species list,12 inhabited the mountain. Following the 
discovery of the Mission Blue, a two-year Biological Study13 was 
initiated by the San Bruno Mountain Steering Committee14 III 
6. Id. at 979. 
7.ld. 
8.ld. 
9.ld. 
10.ld. 
11.ld. 
12. See generally 50 C.F.R. §§ 424.01·424.21 (1984) (providing rules for revising the 
Lists of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants and, where appropriate, 
designating or revising their critical habitats). 
13. The study technique employed was a mark·release-recapture of the butterflies. 
This technique entails capturing individual butterflies and giving each a unique wing 
identification mark. "The butterfly then is released where captured. When a butterfly is 
recaptured, its identity and characteristics are re·recorded. By observing the proportion 
of marked animals to unmarked animals in subsequent capture periods, experts infer the 
population size and distribution of the butterfly in the study area." 760 F.2d at 980 n.4. 
14. The Steering Committee consisted of representatives of San Mateo County, the 
cities of Brisbane, Daly City, and South San Francisco, Visitacion Associates, other pro-
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order to determine the population and distribution of the Mis-
sion Blue Butterfly on the mountain, and to determine whether 
development would conflict with the butterfly's continued 
existence. IIi 
In October 1981, the Steering Committee began developing 
a Habitat Conservation Plan (Plan) to provide an approach by 
which habitat protection and real estate development on the 
mountain would take place at the same time!6 Under the 
"Agreement with Respect to the San Bruno Mountain Area 
Habitat Conservation Plan" (Agreement)17 implementing the 
Plan, 793 privately-owned acres were to be dedicated to local 
agencies as permanent open space, eighty-one percent of the 
open space on the mountain was to be preserved as undisturbed 
habitat, and another three percent of open space was to be re-
stored after temporary disturbance during construction.18 The 
Plan and the Agreement also provided for the permanent pro-
tection of eighty-six percent of the Mission Blue's habitat, for 
funding of $60,000 annually for habitat conservation and en-
hancement, and for continuing and comprehensive restrictions 
on land development. 19 
In July 1982, a combined Environmental Impact Report20 
and Environmental Assessment21 of the Plan and proposed per-
mit were made public for hearing and comment.22 The Service 
received both favorable and adverse comments, and in its permit 
findings and final Environmental Impact ReportlEnvironmental 
Assessment, considered and responded to these comments.23 
Then, in November 1982, the Service received a formal applica-
tion for a permit for the incidental taking of the Mission Blue 
spective developers, landowners, the Service, the California Department of Fish and 
Game, and the Committee to Save San Bruno Mountain. Id. at 979, 980. 
15. Id. at 980. 
16. Id. 
17. The Agreement was executed by the county, the cities, the major landowners 
and developers, the California Department of Fish and Game, and the California Depart-
ment of Parks and Recreation. Id. at 980. 
18.Id. 
19. Id. at 984. 
20. See generally CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21165 (West 1986) (California law 
governing the preparation of an Environmental Impact Report). 
21. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (defining an Environmental Assessment). 
22. 760 F.2d at 980. 
23. [d. at 984. 
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Butterfly.24 
In March 1983, the Service issued a Biological Opinion con-
cluding that the development planned under the permit would 
not jeopardize the continued existence of the Mission Blue But-
terfly on San Bruno Mountain.211 The Service also issued a Find-
ing of No Significant Impact26 stating that issuance of the per-
mit would not significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment.26 Subsequently, the Service issued the permit, con-
ditioned upon implementation of the Agreement and the Plan.28 
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In August 1983, Friends of Endangered Species filed an ac-
tion in the district court for declaratory and injunctive relief.29 
Plaintiff contended that because the field studies were method-
010gically flawed, the Service's findings, relying on the field data, 
were arbitrary and capricious, and that approval of the permit 
based on such findings constituted an abuse of the agency's dis-
cretion.30 Friends of Endangered Species also alleged that the 
Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Assessment's dis-
cussion of environmental impacts and alternatives to develop-
ment on the mountain was insufficient under NEP A, and that a 
full Environmental Impact Statement was required.31 
In November 1983, plaintiff moved the district court for a 
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt 
certain grading work on the mountain. 311 Both motions were de-
nied by the district court, and defendant's motion for summary 
24. [d. 
25. Id. 980, 981. 
26. Id. at 981. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1984) (defining a Finding of No 
Significant Impact). 
27. 760 F.2d at 981. This finding obviated the need for an Environmental Impact 
Statement. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). See also Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. 
Pierce, 667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982), where it was contended that NEPA had been vio-
lated by the failure to prepare an EIS for the Boise Downtown Center Redevelopment 
Project. The court held an EIS was not required as it concluded that an Environmental 
Assessment Finding of No Significant Impact was reasonable. Id. at 862. 
28. 760 F.2d at 981. 
29. 760 F.2d at 981. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. 
32.Id. 
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judgment was granted.33 Following the ruling, Friends of Endan-
gered Species appealed the grant of summary judgment to the 
Ninth Circuit.34 
IV. BACKGROUND 
A. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The legislative development of endangered species protec-
tion in the United States began with the Endangered Species 
Preservation Act of 1966.3~ In that Act, Congress recognized the 
problem of the extermination of native species, and declared its 
intention to prevent the elimination of endangered species.36 In 
this initial attempt at endangered species preservation, Congress 
mandated that the various federal departments should seek to 
protect species of native fish and wildlife threatened with extinc-
tion, and, insofar as practicable and consistent with the primary 
purposes of such bureaus, agencies, and services should preserve 
the habitats of threatened species on lands under their 
jurisdiction.37 
With the enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 
197338 Congress recognized that the provisions of the 1966 Act 
were not sufficient to protect endangered species. Thus, in the 
1973 Act, Congress expanded the scope of endangered species 
protection to include endangered and threatened species, as well 
as the ecosystems on which such species depend.39 Furthermore, 
33. [d. See 589 F. Supp. 113, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
34. 760 F.2d at 981. 
35. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 
(1966), amended by Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 
83 Stat. 282, 283 (1969), repealed by Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982). 
36. "The purposes of this Act are to provide a program for the conservation, protec-
tion, restoration, and propagation of selected species of native fish and wildlife ... that 
are threatened with extinction." Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. 
No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926, 926 (1966) (repealed 1973). 
37. [d. at 80 Stat. 926. 
38. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982». 
39. 
The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby 
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened 
species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for 
the conservation of such endangered species and threatened 
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in this Act, Congress declared that all federal departments and 
agencies should seek to conserve endangered species and 
threatened species, and should utilize their authorities in fur-
therance of those purposes.40 While there have been various 
amendments since the enactment of the Endangered Species Act 
of 1973, most recently in 1982, the purpose and policy of the Act 
remain essentially unchanged.41 
Aside from its general purpose of conserving endangered 
and threatened species, a number of specific sections in the pre-
sent version of the Endangered Species Act are relevant to the 
court's decision in Friends.42 Section 7(a)43 refers to federal 
agency actions and consultations, and stipulates that "[e]ach 
Federal agency shall . . . insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modifi-
cation of habitat of such species .... "44 Section 7(C)4C1 also pro-
vides for the preparation of a biological assessment to facilitate 
compliance with the "not likely to jeopardize" clause.46 
While the Act generally prohibits the taking of any listed 
species,47 it also provides for a number of exceptions.48 Specifi-
species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate .... 
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1982). 
40. Id. § 1531(c) (1982). 
41. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982) (stating the present version of the 
Act). 
42.Id. 
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1982). 
44. Id. § 1536(a)(2). As interpreted and implemented in 50 C.F.R. § 402.01, section 7 
imposes three burdens upon federal agencies: (1) to utilize their authorities to carry out 
conservation programs for listed species; (2) to insure that its activities or programs will 
not jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species; and (3) to insure that their 
activities or programs do not result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical 
habitat. 60 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1984). 
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1982). 
46. Id. Cf, 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(f) (1984) (requiring a federal agency to obtain addi-
tional information if it is determined that there is insufficient information to conclude 
that an activity is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species). 
47. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1982). 
48. In the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the exceptions to the taking prohibition 
were limited to acts for scientific purposes, or acts for the enhancement of propagation 
or survival of the affected species. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 
87 Stat. 884, 896 (1973). Largely due to the decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the allowable exceptions were greatly expanded. See generally 
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cally, section 1049 permits "any taking otherwise prohibited. 
if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carry-
ing out of an otherwise lawful activity."lIo Under this provision 
an applicant must submit a conservation plan to the appropriate 
federal agency which may authorize an incidental taking if it de-
termines that (1) the taking will be incidental, (2) the applicant 
will minimize and mitigate the impact of such taking, (3) the 
applicant will insure that adequate funding for the plan will be 
provided, and (4) the taking will not appreciably reduce the like-
lihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild. 111 
The standard of review for administrative decisions under 
the Endangered Species Act is of crucial importance. Because 
the Act contains no internal standard of review, section 706 of 
the Administrative Procedure Actll2 governs. Under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, the appropriate standard of review for 
administrative decisions involving the Endangered Species Act 
is the "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law"1i3 standard. Applying this standard, 
administrative action is upheld if the agency has "considered the 
relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between 
the facts found and the choice made."1i4 
Recently the United States Supreme Court expounded on 
this standard and stated: 
Normally, an agency [action] would be arbitrary 
and capricious if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1982) (stating the various exceptions as they presently stand). 
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1982). 
50. [d. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
51. [d. § 1539(a)(2)(A), (B). 
52. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). 
53. [d. § 706(2)(A). 
54. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 
U.S. 87 (1983). The Court considered a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decision 
that licensing boards should assume, for purposes of NEPA, that the permanent storage 
of certain nuclear wastes would have no significant environmental impact (the so-called 
zero release aasumption) and thus should not affect the decision whether to license a 
particular power plant. [d. at 90. The NRC in its statement announcing the rule, summa-
rized the major uncertainties of long-term storage of nuclear waates, noted that the 
probability of intrusion waa small, and found the evidence tentative but favorable that 
an appropriate storage site could be found. [d. at 94. The Court upheld the NRC's rule, 
finding its decision waa not arbitrary and capricious, and was within the bounds of rea-
soned decisionmaking. [d. at 105. 
7
White and Williams: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
100 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:93 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of 
the problem, offered an explanation for its deci-
sion that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise. U 
Furthermore, as the standard has been interpreted, the re-
view under it is a limited one. For example, in Citizens To Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe,r.o the Court stated that "[a]lthough 
this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ulti-
mate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not em-
powered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."117 
In Stop H-3 Association v. Dole,1I8 the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed a question similar to that at issue in Friends. In Stop H-
3, the court considered whether an agency's decision was arbi-
trary and capricious, when the agency relied on a biological 
opinion regarding an endangered species.1I9 The appellants had 
challenged the adequacy of the biological opinion as the basis for 
a finding that a proposed highway project was not likely to jeop-
ardize the continued existence of a rare species of bird.60 The 
court concluded as a matter of law that the decision to rely on 
the biological opinion was not arbitrary and capricious.61 In the 
court's view, there was no doubt that the agency had complied 
with consultation obligations and relied on an opinion issued by 
an expert agency.62 The testimony challenging the conclusions 
55. Motor Vehicle Mfr's. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). The Court 
held that a decision by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rescinding 
the requirement that motor vehicles produced after September 1982 be equipped with 
passive restraints to protect the safety of the occupants of the vehicle in the event of a 
collision was arbitrary and capricious. [d. at 43. 
56. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The Court, here, reviewed a decision by the Secretary of 
Transportation to authorize construction of an interstate highway through a public park, 
and reversed and remanded for a review of the Secretary's decision based upon the whole 
record. [d. at 420. According to the Court, in deciding whether the Secretary's decision 
was arbitrary and capricious a court "must consider whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judg-
ment." [d. at 416. 
57. [d. 
58. 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2344 (1985). 
59. 740 F.2d at 1458. 
60. [d. at 1459. 
61. [d. at 1460. 
62. [d. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/10
1986] ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 101 
contained in the biological opinion was unimportant as the testi-
mony offered no information that had not already been evalu-
ated by the expert agency.63 Thus, the agency's ultimate conclu-
sion that the highway was not likely to jeopardize the existence 
of the endangered species "clearly was grounded on a considera-
tion of the relevant factors and, not being unreasonable as a 
matter of law, was not a clear error of judgment. "64 As a result, 
the court held that the agency had complied with the mandate 
of the Endangered Species Act.611 
B. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
In enacting the National Environmental Policy Act, Con-
gress declared its intention to "encourage productive and enjoy-
able harmony between man and his environment; [and] to pro-
mote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere."66 While such a statement seems to 
indicate an intention to declare a national environmental policy, 
the Code of Federal Regulations demonstrates that the real 
function of NEP A is to insure that public officials and citizens 
are informed about environmental effects before actions are 
taken.67 In accord with such a purpose, one of the key provisions 
of NEP A is the requirement that all federal agencies include an 
Environmental Impact Statement68 in every recommendation or 
63. [d. 
64. [d. 
65. [d. 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982). 
67. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1982). "NEPA procedures must insure that environ-
mental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made 
and before actions are taken. The information must be of high quality. Accurate scien-
tific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing 
NEPA." [d. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), where the Court reversed a decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia requiring additional information in an Environmen-
tal Impact Statement. "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, 
but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." [d. at 558. 
68. Section 4332(C) defines an Environmental Impact Statement as a detailed state-
ment of the responsible official on 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
9
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report on proposals for "major federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment."69 
As the Ninth Circuit has interpreted NEPA,70 its purpose is 
"to assure that federal agencies are fully aware of the present 
and future environmental impact of their decisions."71 Thus, the 
court's role is to ensure that the agency has taken a "hard look" 
at environmental consequences.72 
When reviewing agency determinations that preparation of 
an Environmental Impact Statement was not necessary, the 
Ninth Circuit has consistently employed a reasonableness stan-
dard.78 For example, in City of Davis v. Coleman,74 the court 
reviewed a decision by the Federal Highway Administration not 
to prepare an EIS for the construction of a freeway interchange. 
Holding that an EIS was necessary, the court stated that its task 
was to determine whether the responsible agency has reasonably 
concluded that the project will have no significant adverse envi-
ronmental consequences.76 Thus, the court found that substan-
tial questions about the environmental consequences of a federal 
action had been raised, and that the "responsible agencies 
should not be allowed to proceed with the proposed action in 
ignorance of what those consequences will be."76 
term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable committments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should 
it be implemented. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982). 
69. [d. 
70. See Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 
1981), where the Ninth Circuit upheld a decision by an agency within the Department of 
the Interior to authorize the construction of 500 kilovolt power transmission lines across 
the lands of farmers. Plaintiff's primary contention was that the Environmental Impact 
Statement on the proposed power line was not in conformance with NEPA. 
71. [d. at 592. 
72. [d. (citing with approval Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976». 
73. The Ninth Circuit has also employed a reasonableness standard in determining 
the adequacy of the contents of an Environmental Impact Statement. "The adequacy of 
the contents of an EIS is determined by a rule of reason, which requires only a reasona-
bly thorough discussion of the significant 89pects of the probable environmental conse-
quences." Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 592 (9th 
Cir. 1981). 
74. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975). 
75. [d. at 673 (citing Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 
1973». 
76. 521 F.2d 661, 675 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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In Foundation For North American Wild Sheep v. U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture,77 the court expounded upon that 
theme. When considering an agency's determination that re-
opening a road in the Angeles National Forest would not have 
an impact upon a herd of Bighorn sheep the court stated that 
"[i]t is firmly established in this Circuit that an agency's deter-
mination that a particular project does not require the prepara-
tion of an Environmental Impact Statement is to be upheld un-
less unreasonable."78 In finding that preparation of an EIS was 
necessary, the court held that the agency had failed to take the 
requisite "hard look" at the environmental consequences, 'and 
that the agency's conclusion that reopening the road would have 
no significant effect was unreasonable.79 
Also relevant to the court's decision in the present case, are 
the requirements that an agency discuss reasonable alternatives 
to a proposed action,80 and include a worst-case scenario where 
information is incomplete or unavailable.81 As to the require-
ment of a discussion of reasonable alternatives, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has made its position quite clear. In State of California v. 
Block,82 the court reviewed an Environmental Impact Statement 
for a Forest Service decision to allocate roadless national forest 
system land among three management categories. Holding that 
the Forest Service did not consider an adequate range of alter-
natives, the court stated that "[j]udicial review of the range of 
alternatives considered by an agency is governed by a 'rule of 
reason' that requires an agency to set forth only those alterna-
tives necessary to permit a 'reasoned choice.' "83 
77. 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982). 
78. [d. at 1177. 
79. [d. at 1178. 
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(iii) (1982). 
81. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1984). A worst case analysis is required if 
(1) the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to 
a reasoned choice among alternatives and is not known and 
the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant, or (2) the infor-
mation relevant to adverse impacts is important to the deci-
sion and the means to obtain it are not known .... 
[d. § 1502.22(b). 
82. 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982). 
83. [d. at 767. "An EIS, however, need not consider an alternative whose effect can-
not be reasonably ascertained, and whose implementation is deemed remote and specula-
tive." [d. (citing Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981». 
11
White and Williams: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
104 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:93 
The requirement of a worst-case scenario was considered in 
Save Our Ecosystems v. Clarks. where the spraying of herbicides 
on Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management lands was 
challenged. Holding that the worst case analysis was inadequate, 
the court assessed that "[t]he purpose of the [worst case] analy-
sis is to carry out NEP A's mandate for full disclosure to the 
public of the potential consequences of agency decisions, and to 
cause agencies to consider those potential consequences when 
acting on the basis of scientific uncertainties or gaps in available 
information. S~ 
V. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
This case involved alleged violations of two distinct acts, 
which the court examined independently. The analysis began 
with an examination of the Endangered Species Act, followed by 
an examination of the National Environmental Policy Act. 
A. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment, the court began with appellant's contention that the Ser-
vice's issuance of a permit was a violation of sections 10(a)S6 and 
7(a)(2)S7 of the Endangered Species Act. The question posed to 
the court was whether the appellant had raised a genuine issue 
of material fact in asserting that the Service acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in issuing the permit under the Act.88 
Under section 10(a)89 of the Endangered Species Act, the 
Service may permit an applicant to engage in the "taking" of an 
endangered species under certain circumstances.9o Appellant 
challenged the sufficiency of the permit findings as to whether 
the applicant would minimize and mitigate the impacts of the 
84. 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). 
85. [d. at 1244. 
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1982). 
87. [d. § 1536(a)(2). 
88. 760 F.2d at 982. 
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1982). 
90. "Taking" is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19) 
(1982). 
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taking to the maximum extent practicable, and whether the tak-
ing would not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival 
of the species.91 
In its analysis of appellant's claims, the court began by ex-
amining whether the field study adequately supported the Ser-
vice's finding that the taking would not appreciably reduce the 
likelihood of the survival of the species.92 According to the court, 
the Service went beyond this minimum requirement in conclud-
ing that the permit and Plan were likely to enhance the survival 
of the Mission Blue Butterfly.98 The court rejected appellant's 
contention that the Service's conclusion was arbitrary and capri-
cious because of alleged shortcomings -in the. Biological Study 
upon which the conclusion was based.94 In the court's view, the 
legislative history of the 1982 amendment to section 10(a) indi-
cated that the Service acted properly in relying on the Biological 
Study.911 That legislative history suggests that Congress would 
view appellee's conduct in the present case as the paradigm ap-
proach to compliance with section 10(a).96 
The court also found that the appellant had failed to bring 
many of the purported errors and inconsistencies in the field 
study to the attention of the Service until after the district court 
had denied their motion for summary judgment.97 Furthermore, 
the Service solicited and considered expert and public comment 
on the Biological Study before issuing the permit, and the study 
itself acknowledged methodological limitations.98 There was no 
evidence that the permit was issued either in ignorance or delib-
91. 760 F.2d at 982. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (ii), (iv), (1982) (per-
mitting an otherwise prohibited taking under certain circumstances). 
92. 760 F.2d at 982. 
93. [d. According to the Service the species' survival would be enhanced because a 
substantial amount of its critical habitat would be transferred to public ownership, and a 
permanent program to protect its habitat would be established. [d. at 982 n.6. 
94. [d. at 982. Friends of Endangered Species contended that low recapture rates 
and mistaken recaptures by the field crew in the mark-release-recapture phase of the 
study invalidated the study's conclusions. [d. 
95. [d. at 983 (citing S. REP. No. 418, 97TH CON G., 20 SESS. 10 (1982), ANO H.R. REP. 
NO. 835, 97TH CONG., 20 SESS. 31-32 (1982)). 
96. 760 F.2d at 982, 983 (citing with approval S. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
10 (1982), and H.R. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1982)). 
97. 760 F.2d at 983. 
98. [d. 
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erate disregard of the Biological Study's limitations.99 Instead, 
the Service made an effort to consider all criticisms of the Bio-
logical Study before relying on it.loO Thus, the court held that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact to preclude the dis-
trict court from determining that the Service had complied with 
the Endangered Species Act, and that the Service had not acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously in relying on the Biological Study. 101 
The next issue concerned whether the Service acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously in concluding that the Habitat Conser-
vation Plan complied with section lO(a)'s requirement to mini-
mize and mitigate the impact of the taking upon endangered 
species. l02 Appellant's primary contention was that the develop-
ment of an alternative site on the mountain, the Saddle Area, 
would more effectively mitigate the effects of development. l03 
However, the court found that the Service had considered and 
rejected development of the Saddle Area on the basis that it 
contained unique wetlands and endangered plants, and that its 
development would have biological impacts greater than that 
produced by the Saddle's proposed use as a country park. l04 
Furthermore, the Plan contained various measures to minimize 
and mitigate the impact of development upon the Mission Blue 
Butterfly, and these additional measures would playa significant 
role in enhancing the protection of endangered species on the 
mountain. 1011 Thus, the court concluded that there was no genu-
ine factual dispute as to whether the Service acted arbitrarily or 
unreasonably in determining that the Plan complied with sec-
tion lO(a)'s mitigation requirement}06 
The court next analyzed appellant's claim that the Service 
failed to comply with section 7(a)(2) of the ESA!07 Under this 
section, a federal agency is required to "insure that any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
99.Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 984. 
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982). 
103. 760 F.2d at 984. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982). 
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species."108 Accordingly, the Service determined that the permit 
was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Mis-
sion Blue Butterfly.l09 Appellant challenged this conclusion on 
the basis that the source relied upon by the Service did not re-
present the best scientific data available.uo This contention was 
rejected by a finding that the Service addressed the limitations 
of the Biological Study, was not directed to any better available 
data, and considered whatever data and other materials appel-
lant provided.lll The court cited Stop H-3 Association v. Dolel12 
for the proposition that when examining an alleged violation 
under section 7(a)(2), "the issue for review is' whether-the 
[agency's] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant 
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment."llS 
Accordingly, the court held the Service did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously, or in violation of section 7(a)(2), by considering all 
the data it received.u , 
B. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
In its examination of alleged violations of NEPA in Friends, 
the court began by announcing it would proceed to review the 
Service's actions concerning the NEP A provisions at issue under 
a reasonableness standard.116 The first alleged NEP A violation 
examined was appellant's contention that issuance of the permit 
required preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement in 
addition to the Environmental Impact Report/Environmental 
Assessment.u6 This contention essentially concerned whether 
the Service erred in issuing its Finding of No Significant Impact. 
In examining the Service's decision in this regard, the court 
pointed out that the decision not to prepare an EIS should be 
108. Id. 
109. 760 F.2d at 984, 985. 
110. Id. at 985. Section 7(a) of the Endangered Species Act further states that "[i]n 
fulfilling the requirements of this paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific and 
commercial data available." Codified at 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2) (1982). 
111. 760 F.2d at 985. 
112. 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984). See supra text accompanying note 58. See also 
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
113. 760 F.2d at 985 (citing Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740.F.2d 1442, 1459 (9th Cir. 
1984)). 
114. 760 F.2d at 985. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
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upheld if reasonable,117 and that a court should not substitute 
its judgment for that of an agency if the agency's decision was 
fully informed and well considered.1I8 Thus, it was noted that 
the Service had sought out and considered extensive comments 
on the Biological Study during the public comment period and 
afterward, and incorporated these comments into its permit 
findings and final Plan. lie 
Furthermore, the extensive coordination and agreement be-
tween the state and federal government was a factor supporting 
the Service's decision not to prepare an EIS.120 Finally, the like-
lihood of the enhancement of the chances for survival of the en-
dangered species, due to the mitigation measures in the permit 
and the Plan, was an additional factor in support of the Ser-
vice's decision not to prepare an EIS.121 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the Service acted reasonably in not preparing an 
EIS, and that to overturn the Service's decision would represent 
an unjustifiable intrusion into the administrative process.122 
Next, the court rejected appellant's claim that the Environ-
mental Impact Report/Environmental Assessment did not ade-
quately discuss reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.123 
Under NEPA, all agencies of the federal government are to in-
clude in any recommendation or report on major federal actions 
117. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
118. 760 F.2d at 986 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)). Vermont Yankee further stated that 
"[a]dministrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for 
substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute ... not simply 
because the court is unhappy with the result reached." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. at 558. 
119. 760 F.2d at 986. 
120. [d. at 987. 
121. Regarding the level of mitigation measures in determining whether preparation 
of an Environmental Impact Statement is necessary, see Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. 
Pierce, 667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982), where the Ninth Circuit held that "modifications to 
the original design ... may eliminate or mitigate the project's effects on air quality. 
These modifications may make the preparation of an EIS unnecessary." [d. at 860. Com-
pare Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982), in which 
it was held that an Environmental Impact Statement was not required when a proposal 
is modified "by adding specific mitigation measures which completely compensate for 
any possible adverse environmental impacts stemming from the original proposal .... " 
[d. at 682 (emphasis added). 
122. 760 F.2d at 987 (citing Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 
678, 684 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
123. 760 F.2d at 987. 
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significantly affecting the quality of the environment, a detailed 
statement on alternatives to the proposed action.124 As the court 
noted, this provision does not demand a full discussion of all 
land-use alternatives.l2Ci In the present case, the EIR/EA listed 
various alternatives to issuance of the permit, including those of 
no development, more limited development, and public acquisi-
tion of all private land on the mountain.126 Additionally, the 
EIR/EA contained a brief discussion on the alternate develop-
ment of the Saddle Area and rejected it.127 This, according to 
the court, amounted to an adequate discussion of reasonable 
alternatives. 128 
Finally, appellant challenged the Service's action on the ba-
sis that NEP A requires the EIR/EA to contain a "worst case 
analysis."129 This claim was rejected as the court concluded that 
the Service obtained the impact information it needed from the 
Biological Study and Plan, and included it in the EIR/EA.lsO 
Moreover, the court determined that the staged development of 
the mountain, and corresponding staged reconsideration of envi-
ronmental impacts under the Plan, functioned to minimize the 
importance of a "worst case analysis" in the present case. lSI 
VI. CRITIQUE 
The present decision is appropriate in a number of respects. 
The court recognized and applied the traditional standards of 
review to the alleged violations of the Endangered Species Act 
and the National Environmental Policy Act. It realized that its 
function is to insure that the decision of an agency is based upon 
a consideration of the relevant evidence and factors, and that it 
is not to substitute its judgment for that of an agency. The court 
properly recognized and applied the "hard look" doctrine as an-
124. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1982). 
125. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
126. 760 F.2d at 988. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. at 987. 
129. [d. at 988. 
130. [d. 
131. [d. See also Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 614 (9th Cir. 1984) (a 
worst-case analysis was not required at the first stage of a project where each stage re-
mained separate, and a worst case analysis could be considered at a later stage). 
17
White and Williams: Environmental Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
110 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:93 
nounced by the Supreme Court in Kleppe v. Sierra Club. 132 
From the evidence presented, it was determined that the Service 
had considered the relevant evidence and factors, and that the 
Service's decision was not unreasonable in view of that informa-
tion. The court properly deferred to the judgment of the appro-
priate agency and declined to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency. 
On another level, the present decision does not permit the 
destruction of the Mission Blue Butterfly.13s The provisions of 
ESA and NEP A have successfully limited development on San 
Bruno Mountain to approximately one-fifth of the available 
space.13• The developers voluntarily agreed to a number of re-
quirements designed to enhance the likelihood of survival of the 
Mission Blue Butterfly.131! In fact, the court found the virtual 
agreement among government officials, private parties, and local 
environmentalists on the development of the mountain to be a 
persuasive factor favoring the Service. ISS On this level, uphold-
ing the Service's decision to permit development, represents a 
valid compromise between the goals of development and the 
goals of preservation of endangered species and preservation of 
the environment. 
Nevertheless, this case also presents a number of grounds 
for concern. For the most part, the plaintiff's contentions re-
volved around substantive criticism of the Biological Study, and 
the claim that errors in that Study rendered conclusions based 
upon it invalid.137 Yet, the court did not seriously examine this 
claim. Despite the language of section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered 
132. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). In Kleppe the Court stated that "[tJhe only role for a 
court is to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences; 
it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of 
action to be taken.' .. [d. at 410 n.21 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mor-
ton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972». 
133. Under the Plan and the Agreement, 86% of the Mission Blue's habitat is to be 
protected. 760 F.2d at 984. 
134. The Agreement provides that 81 % of the open space on the mountain is to be 
preserved as undistrubed habitat with another three percent of open space to be restored 
after temporary disturbances during construction. [d. at 980. 
135. [d. at 984. 
136. [d. at 986. As the court stated, "the extensive coordination and agreement be-
tween the state and federal government is a factor supporting the Service's decision not 
to prepare an [Environmental Impact Statement]." [d. at 987. 
137. [d. at 981. 
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Species Act,188 requiring an agency to insure that its actions are 
not likely to jeopardize an endangered species, there was no 
showing by the Service that the study was accurate, or that its 
conclusions were valid. The court reasoned that the Service had 
examined the impact of the issuance of the permit upon the 
Mission Blue Butterfly, and that therefore the Finding of No 
Significant Impact was not arbitrary and capricious. lS9 Yet, the 
legislative history of the 1978 amendments to the ESA140 indi-
cate that section 7(a)(2)141 was intended to give the benefit of 
the doubt to the species, and to place the burden on the agency 
to demonstrate that its action will not jeopardize the continued 
existence of an endangered species.142 As the court's reasoning 
illustrates, rather than placing the burden on the Service to 
uemonstrate that its actions were not likely to jeopardize the 
Mission Blue, the court placed the burden on the plaintiff to 
show that the Service's action was likely to jeopardize the en-
dangered species. 
Similarly, the court found that the Biological Study ade-
quately supported the Service's findings. us This conclusion is 
apparently based upon the congressional language surrounding a 
138. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982). 
139. As the court stated, "the Service was aware of all relevant limitations on the 
Biological study and the field data, and the Service addressed those limitations in its 
Permit Findings." 760 F.2d at 985. 
140. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1979 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2572, 2576. See also Note, Hammond v. North Slope Borough: 
The Endangered Species Issue-An Exercise In Judicial Lethargy, 1 ALASKA L. REV. 
129, 137 (1984). 
141. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1982). 
142. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1979 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2572, 2576: 
Id. 
This language continues to give the benefit of the doubt to the 
species, and it would continue to place the burden on the ac-
tion agency to demonstrate to the consulting agency that its 
action will not violate Section 7(a)(2). Furthermore, the lan-
guage will not absolve Federal agencies from the responsibility 
of cooperating with the wildlife agencies in developing ade-
quate information upon which to base a biological opinion. If a 
Federal agency proceeds with the action in the face of inade-
quate knowledge or information, the agency does so with the 
risk that it has not satisfied the standard of Section 7(a)(2) 
and that new information might reveal that the agency has not 
satisfied the standard of Section 7(a)(2). 
143. 760 F.2d at 984. 
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1982 amendment to the Endangered Species Act. lH Yet, an ex-
amination of that language reveals that both the Senate and the 
House were focusing primarily on the Habitat Conservation Plan 
rather than the Biological Study. The Senate Report focused on 
the Conservation Plan for San Bruno Mountain, not the Field 
Study.l411 In fact, in the Senate Report, the Field Study is not 
even mentioned. l46 In the House Report, mention is made of the 
Field Study, but only that it was independent and exhaustive 
and provided support for the Conservation Plan.147 From the 
comments in the House Report, it is clear that the House did 
not concern itself with the accuracy of the Field Study.l48 Thus, 
the court's reliance on the language surrounding the 1982 
amendment to the Endangered Species Act is misplaced. Al-
though the Service followed the proper procedure in authorizing 
a Biological Study, the court did not require the Service to 
demonstrate the adequacy or accuracy of that study. 
A secondary concern is the level of review the court utilized 
in this case. The court has applied the appropriate standard of 
review, and recognized its role as a limited one. Yet, there is a 
distinction between a limited role and a non-existent role. For 
example, the Supreme Court stated in Citizens To Preserve 
Overton Park v. Volpe149 that the generally applicable standards 
of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act require the 
reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry.lllo An agency's 
144. S. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1982), and H. R. REP. No. 835, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1982). 
145. S. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1982) states that the "project devel-
oper, in cooperation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and State authorities is 
developing a conservation plan for the protection and enhancement of the butterflies 
habitat, to be financed through an assessment on home owners." [d. 
[d. 
146. [d. 
147. H. R. REP. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1982) states: 
148. [d. 
Prior to developing the conservation plan, the County of San 
Mateo conducted an independent, exhaustive biological study 
which determined the location of the butterflies, and the loca-
tion of their food plants. The biological study also developed 
substantial information regarding the habits and life cycles of 
the butterflies and other species of concern. The biological 
study was conducted over a two year period and at one point 
involved 50 field personnel. 
149. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
150. [d. at 415. 
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decision may be entitled to a presumption of regularity, but 
such a presumption does not shield its action from a thorough 
review. llli In the present decision a thorough, probing, in-depth 
review was not undertaken. Careful scrutiny of the agency's de-
cision would have been possible without the court substituting 
its judgment for that of the Service. Yet, the review was so lim-
ited that serious questions about the accuracy of the Biological 
Study, and the continued existence of the Mission Blue Butter-
fly remain. 
Finally, the present case has potentially serious implications 
for the future of the Endangered Species Act and the National 
Environmental Policy Act. The Service's decision to allow devel-
opment, knowing of the limitations of the Biological Study, does 
not appear to be consistent with the goals of those acts.11l2 Given 
the concern for the environment, and the purposes and policies 
announced by ESA and NEPA, is it enough to recognize limita-
tions in a Biological Study, or should a decision to allow devel-
opment have been postponed until such limitations could be 
substantively addressed? In allowing the Service's decision to 
stand, the implication for future activity is that an agency 
merely has to comply with the procedural requirements of the 
respective acts. If one of the goals of these acts is to foster the 
incorporation of biological conservation considerations into the 
planning process from the beginning, the present decision sug-
gests that form is more important than substance. For example, 
if an agency undertakes a Biological Study and incorporates its 
conclusions into a development plan, it would be sufficient to 
pass judicial scrutiny under the standard set out in Friends. 
While it is important that agencies follow the proper proce-
dure under the Endangered Species Act and under NEP A, it is 
up to the judicial system to insure that agencies do not lose sight 
of the substantive goals of those acts. While a court may not be 
capable of resolving scientific uncertainties, and should not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of an expert agency, it can require 
an agency to demonstrate that its actions will not jeopardize the 
existence of an endangered species. Thus, while a court should 
properly defer to the expertise of an agency when the basis for 
151. Id. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 35-41 and 66-67. 
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an agency's decision is called into question, an affirmative show-
ing by the agency supporting that decision should be required. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Friends follows the accepted trend of a limited role for the 
courts in challenges to proposed actions under the Endangered 
Species Act and NEP A. The Ninth Circuit has traditionally ap-
plied a deferential standard in reviewing the decisions of an 
agency, and this decision represents another example of that 
deference. Although the present decision raises questions as to 
whether the court has insured that the Service took a "hard 
look" at the environmental consequences of development on San 
Bruno Mountain, the court upheld the judgment of the Service, 
and affirmed the standards it will use in reviewing future chal-
lenges to agency decisionmaking in environmental issues. 
Steven White* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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SUMMARY 
SIERRA CLUB v. F.E.R.C.: A PRELIMINARY PERMIT 
DOES NOT CREATE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission l 
the Ninth Circuit decided that the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (Commission)2 need not prepare an Environmental 
Impact Statement when issuing a preliminary permitS for con-
struction of a hydroelectric project, since this type of permit 
does not authorize anyon-site activity which might affect the 
environment.4 The court also concluded that the Commission 
may issue a preliminary permit for such a project without decid-
ing whether it will ultimately be able to license the project. II 
1. 754 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Poole, J.; the other panel members were 
Canby, J. and Phillips, J., Senior United States Circuit Judge of the Sixth Circuit, sitting 
by designation). 
2. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the successor to the Federal Power 
Commission, licenses hydroelectric facilities on waters under federal jurisdiction. Appli-
cants provide the Commission with information regarding feasibility, compliance with 
state law and environmental impact. 16 U.S.C. § 802 (1976); 18 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1985). The 
Commission is then responsible for preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement 
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C) (1976). 
3. Due to the lengthy licensing procedure, the Commission is authorized to issue a 
preliminary permit, the sole purpose of which is to preserve the applicant's priority over 
later applications for a maximum of three years. 16 U.S.C. § 797(0 (1976). The prelimi-
nary permit is designed to maintain the status quo while the permittee prepares a de-
tailed license application. [d. § 798. 
4. 754 F.2d at 1510. 
5. [d. 
115 
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Consequently, the Sierra Club's challenge to the Commission's 
jurisdiction under the Raker ActS to license the project was 
premature.7 
II. FACTS 
In June 1976, the Modesto and Turlock Irrigation Districts 
applied for a preliminary permit for a new hydroelectric project, 
to be known as Clavey-Wards Ferry Project.8 The proposed 400 
million watt project was to be constructed on the Tuolumne 
River near its confluence with the Clavey River, an area on fed-
eral land managed by the Forest Service and Bureau of Land 
Management.9 Because the outstanding recreational opportuni-
ties provided by the river would be impaired by the hydroelec-
tric development, the Sierra Club, Tuolumne Rivers Expedi-
tions, Inc., and the State of California intervened before the 
Commission to oppose the application. to However, the Commis-
sion granted the permit in April 1983.11 The Sierra Club and 
Tuolumne River Expeditions, Inc., petitioned the Ninth Circuit 
for a review of the Commission's issuance of the permit without 
prior preparation of an EIS, and for a ruling on the Commis-
6. Raker Act, ch. 4, 38 Stat. 242 (1913). The Raker Act allowed San Francisco to 
flood the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park, and to build water and elec-
trical transmission systems through the Park. The Hetch Hetchy water and power sys-
tem was put under the jurisdiction of the Departments of Agriculture and Interior to the 
exclusion of any other federal agencies. Raker Act, 38 Stat. 242 § 4. 
7. 754 F.2d at 1511. 
8. Id. at 1508. As originally proposed, the project would include the Jawbone Diver-
sion Dam and Reservoir, the 5.2 mile Jawbone Ridge Tunnel, the Hunter Point Dam, the 
2 mile Clavey Power Conduit, the Ward's Ferry Dam, and the Clavey and Ward's Ferry 
Powerhouses. Id. 
9.Id. 
10. Id. at 1509. This area is widely known for its whitewater and kayaking opportu-
nities. Id. 
After this case was first submitted to the Ninth Circuit, Congress passed the Califor-
nia Wilderness Act of 1984 which amended the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems 
Act by adding part of the Tuolumne River to the system. 16 U.S.C. § 1274 (1984). The 
court vacated submission of the case, and invited the parties to express their views on 
the effect of this new legislation. Subsequently, relying on the statute's plain language, 
the court decided that the California Wilderness Act did not preclude the issuance of a 
preliminary permit for this potential project because the project is outside the boundary 
of the statutorily designated Wild and Scenic River Area. 754 F.2d at 1509 n.l. 
11. Id. at 1508. Under the preliminary permit, the irrigation district would be al-
lowed to maintain priority of application, in the event of possible subsequent licensing 
applications. It would not be authorized to enter federal land and conduct any studies 
which might disturb the environment. Id. at 1509. 
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sion's jurisdiction to issue a permit under the Raker Act. 111 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit first considered whether the Commis-
sion was required to prepare an EIS prior to the issuance of a 
preliminary permit. It then addressed the challenge raised by 
the Sierra Club to the Commission's jurisdiction to issue the 
permit. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The starting point of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of whether 
an EIS was required was the National Environmental Policy 
Act13 which provides that a federal agency must issue an EIS 
whenever a major federal action significantly affects the human 
environment.14 The Ninth Circuit has expanded this require-
ment to include those actions which may affect the environ-
12. The federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review orders of the Commis-
sion under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (b)(2) (1976) provides that all Americans are to be assured 
"safe, healthy, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings." In 
order to fulfill these goals, the Act mandates that a federal agency must prepare a de-
tailed statement called an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) whenever "major fed-
eral actions significantly affect the human environment." [d. § 4332 (2)(C). The purpose 
of an EIS is to force all federal agencies to take environmental factors into account dur-
ing the decision-making process, giving such factors the same weight as other, more 
traditional concerns such as productivity and efficiency. 40 C.F.R. § 1500. 1 (1985). See 
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 
1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971). NEPA also created the Council on Environmental Quality to carry 
out the Act's goals. 42 U.S.C. § 4371, Executive Order No. 11,514 (March 5, 1970), 3 
C.F.R., 1966-70 comp., p. 1902. The regulations require an EIS to relate where and how 
the environment will be affected by the proposed federal action or decision, and also set 
forth alternatives to the planned action that would avoid or minimize adverse environ-
mental impacts. Moreover, alternatives must be considered that would enhance the envi-
ronment. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1985). 
An Environmental Assessment is a preliminary step in the NEPA process. The En-
vironmental Assessment must briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis to deter-
mine if an EIS is required, facilitate preparation of an EIS if such is found to be neces-
sary, and aid the federal agency in complying with NEPA if no EIS is required. 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.9 (1985). 
The scope of NEPA is intentionally broad, in that it attempts to promote across-
the-board adjustment in federal agency decisionmaking. Scientists' Institute for Public 
Information v. Atomic Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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ment. Iii When reviewing a federal agency's determination that 
no EIS is required prior to the issuance of a permit, it is firmly 
established in this circuit that an agency's decision will be up-
held unless found to be unreasonable. 16 It is also firmly estab-
lished that, if a permit does not authorize any change in the en-
vironmental status quo, it is not unreasonable to dispense with 
the EIS requirement prior to issuance.17 
B. DISCUSSION 
In Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
the Sierra Club claimed that the Commission was required to 
prepare an EIS before issuing a preliminary permit to the irriga-
tion districts for the Clavey-Wards Ferry Project!8 However, the 
preliminary permit was intended only to maintain the priority of 
application, and it prohibited anyon-site construction, testing, 
15. Found. for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. USDA, 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982). The 
Forest Service allowed the reopening of a road that crossed one of the last remaining 
habitats of Desert Bighorn Sheep without preparing an EIS. [d. at 1176. The court held 
this decision to be unreasonable, since the Environmental Assessment on which the Ser-
vice based its decision had glaring omissions such as failing to consider the amount of 
traffic the road would carry and the effect of this traffic on a variety of factors that might 
impact on the sheep. A determination that significant effects will in fact occur is not 
necessary in order that NEPA's exceptionally broad scope may be fulfilled. If substantial 
questions are raised as to whether a project may have a significant effect, an EIS must be 
prepared. [d. at 1178 (emphases in original). 
16. [d. at 1177. A standard of reasonableness is a higher standard requiring a greater 
showing of agency effort than an arbitrary and capricious standard. [d. at 1177 n.24. See 
also Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 
466, 475 (9th Cir. 1984) (reasonableness standard higher than arbitrary and capricious 
standard), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2358 (1985). To satisfy this standard, the federal 
agency is required to take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences. Kleppe v. 
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21. (1976). Although the court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency, if the plaintiff has alleged facts which, if true, show that 
the environment may be significantly affected, the agency must address these issues, or 
its determination not to issue an EIS will be held to be unreasonable. Found. for N. Am. 
Wild Sheep v. FERC, 681 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing City and County of San 
Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir. 1980». 
17. Sierra Club, 754 F.2d at 1510. See Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 
623 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1980). Since federal action in aiding a private group to buy an 
existing airport did not increase the noise level, the status quo did not change, and no 
EIS was required. [d. at 116. See also South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied 449 U.S. 822 (1980). The granting of a mining patent by the Department of 
the Interior did not allow the patent holders to take any action; rather, permits from the 
Forest Service would be required before anyon-site activity could be undertaken. There-
fore, no EIS was mandated. [d. at 1195. 
18. 754 F.2d at 1509. 
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or feasibility studies.19 The permit clearly required the irrigation 
districts to seek approval from the Forest Service, which man-
aged the land under consideration, before beginning work on the 
project.20 The Forest Service, not the Commission, would there-
fore be responsible for determining the environmental effects of 
the irrigation districts' proposed actions when an application for 
a special use permit was filed. 21 Since the Sierra Club was una-
ble to point to any environmental impact which would result 
from the Commission's issuance of the permit, the court upheld 
the agency's decision that no EIS was required.22 
The court next turned to the Sierra Club's claim that al-
though the proposed project is outside the original Raker Act 
right-of-way, it would be an extensiQn of San Francisco's Hetch 
Hetchy hydroelectric system, and, as such, outside the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction under the Raker Act.23 The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed, holding that the jurisdictional challenge was prema-
ture.24 Since the proposed project would be subject to extensive 
change during the preliminary project planning stage, its rela-
tionship to Hetch Hetchy could not as yet be determined.211 The 
Commission was not required to deny the preliminary permit on 
the speculative ground that it might ultimately be unable to li-
19. [d. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. Special use permits are required by Forest Service Regulations before begin-
ning most on-the-ground investigations. FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 2771.2. 
22. 754 F.2d at 1510. The Ninth Circuit also quickly rejected two additional argu-
ments made by the Sierra Club. First, the Sierra Club claimed that 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 
required the Commission to file an Environmental Assessment to establish the reasona-
bleness of its decision not to prepare an EIS. See supra note 14. The court concluded, 
however, the Commission's permit satisfied this requirement because it provided the fac-
tual basis for determining that there would be no significant effect on the environment as 
a result of the issuance of the permit. 754 F.2d at 1510. 
Second, the Sierra Club argued that the Commission was required to hold an evi-
dentiary hearing. [d. CEQ regulations require such a hearing when there is a substantial 
environmental controversy. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.2(b)(4) (1985). A "controversy" does not 
mean opposition, however, but a dispute as to environmental effects. See Hanly v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). In the instant 
case, there was no environmental controversy because there would be no environmental 
effect stemming from the issuance of the preliminary permit. Therefore, a hearing was 
not required. Sierra Club, 754 F.2d at 1510. 
23. 754 F.2d at 1510. 
24. The Act gives sole jurisdiction over the Hetch Hetchy system to the Secretaries 
of Agriculture and the Interior. Raker Act, 38 Stat. 242 § 4 (1913). See supra note 6. 
25. 754 F.2d at 1511. 
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cense the project under the Raker Act.26 The risk that the pro-
ject will be unlicensable at some future time, the court noted, is 
one being eagerly borne by the irrigation district.27 
III. CONCLUSION 
The court properly found that it was premature to claim a 
Raker Act violation when the proposed project had not yet been 
finally delineated. In striking down the Raker Act challenge, the 
court relied upon the broad principle that the Commission need 
not consider potential problems with licensure at the prelimi-
nary permit stage. Indeed, since the preliminary permit is 
designed only to maintain priority of application while a de-
tailed license application is being prepared, to sustain a jurisdic-
tional challenge would predetermine issues properly raised only 
when the application itself is submitted. 
In rejecting the Sierra Club's petition for review, the Ninth 
Circuit determined that although the mandate of NEP A was to 
force federal action to meet certain environmental criteria, the 
Act required an EIS only for those major federal actions which 
significantly affect the environment.26 Even under the Ninth 
Circuit's expansive interpretation of NEPA, it correctly con-
cluded here that the Sierra Club had failed to establish the 
threshold requirement for an EIS, that is, a showing of environ-
mental impact. Simply stated, the case stands for the proposi-
tion that where no environmental effect can be demonstrated, no 
EIS is required. Yet the implications of the case may be far-
26. See City of Bedford v. FERC, 718 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (not necessary for 
the Commission to determine whether an applicant for a preliminary permit will meet all 
the qualifications for licensing before issuing the permit). 
The proposed Clavey-Ward's Ferry project has, in fact, changed considerably since 
the irrigation districts first applied for a preliminary permit. Two of the originally pro-
posed dams have been dropped, and the project has been renamed the "Ponderosa Pro-
ject." 754 F.2d at 1511 n.3. 
27. 754 F.2d at 1511. The court noted that no other Tuolumne River hydroelectric 
project that has operated in conjunction with Raker Act facilities has been barred by the 
Act. 754 F.2d at 1511 (citing California v. FPC, 345 F.2d 917, 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
382 U.S. 941 (1965». In California v. FPC, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the granting of 
licenses for the New Don Pedro Dam, which is outside the original Raker Act right-of-
way, and immediately downstream from the proposed project, and concluded that the 
Raker Act did not bar the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license to operate. 
345 F.2d at 930. 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). 
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reaching. Environmental groups seeking to block future projects 
may now be foreclosed from demanding an EIS in the prelimi-
nary planning stage, and thus may have to delay an attack until 
the project is more mature. 
Michael S. Williams* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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